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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role played by Fechner’s psychophysics—the new science meant to measure
sensation as a function of the stimulus—in the development of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. It will
show how Cohen, in the early 1870s, in order to make sense of Kant’s obscure principle of the
Anticipations of Perception, resorted to psychophysics’ parlance of the relation between stimulus
and sensation. By the end of the decade, Cohen’s remarks encouraged the early ‘Cohen circle’
(Stadler, Elsas, Müller) to pursue what were often sophisticated analyses of the problem of the
measurability of sensation. This paper argues that in reaction to these contributions, Cohen shifted
his interests towards the history of the infinitesimal calculus in his controversial 1883 monograph,
Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode. This book, with its characteristic amalgam of transcendental
philosophy and history of science, paved the way to what, around 1900, would become the ‘Marburg
school’ (Natorp, Cassirer, Görland and others). However, it also interrupted a promising discussion
in Marburg on the problem of measurability in science.
Keywords: Neo-Kantianism, Marburg School, Hermann Cohen, Psychophysics, Gustav Theodor
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Introduction
In 1912, Ernst Cassirer (1912) contributed to the special issue of the Kant-Studien that honored
Hermann Cohen’s retirement—his mentor and teacher, and the recognized founding father of the
so-called ‘Marburg school’ of Neo-Kantianism (Poma, [1989] 1997). In the context of an otherwise
rather conventional presentation of Cohen’s interpretation of Kant, Cassirer made a remark that
is initially surprising. It is “anything but accurate,” he wrote, to regard Cohen’s philosophy as
focused “exclusively on the mathematical theory of nature,” (Cassirer, 1912, p. 256) as is usually
done. A reconstruction of the genesis of Cohen’s thought, Cassirer continued, would already refute
this interpretation. Actually, “[t]he conditions of the problem, as they were presented to Cohen at
that time [die Cohen vorfand], lay at least as much in the critique of physiology as in the critique of
physics” (Cassirer, 1912, p. 256).1 From the “concept of sensation,” Cassirer went on, Cohen was
initially led to investigate “the [concept] of ‘stimulus’,” (Cassirer, 1912, p. 256) which was regarded
only in the second instance as a possible object of physics. I suspect that this allusion to the relation
between sensation and stimulus, made only in passing, might escape the attention of most readers.
However, Cassirer alluded to an over ten year debate initiated by Cohen and continued by a small
1Henceforth the letter spacing in the original has been rendered as italics.
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group of early sympathizers—a little ‘Cohen circle’ as it might be called, to distinguish it from
what only later would become the ‘Marburg school’. Surprisingly, this debate has been completely
neglected by historians of Neo-Kantianism, despite being an important line in the development of
the history of 19th century philosophy and science.
At the beginning of the 1860s, the nearly sixty-year-old physicist Gustav Theodor Fechner (1860)
claimed to have established a new science, which he called ‘psychophysics ’. Psychophysics sought to
measure ‘sensation’ on the basis of its functional dependency on the ‘stimulus’, and, at the same time,
to present in rigorous form the problem of the relation between the mental and the physical. Starting
from Ernst Heinrich Weber’s experimental results (Weber, 1834; Weber, 1846), Fechner suggested
that infinitesimal increments of sensation were directly proportional to infinitesimal increments
in stimulus and inversely proportional to the amount of the original stimulus. Thus, the function
relating sensation to the stimulus would be logarithmic (Fechner, 1860, p. 2:9–14). In the successive
decades, a debate was sparked among philosophers, psychologists, physicists, and mathematicians
over whether sensations could be measured at all (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, Michell1999). Many, if
not most, of the writings of the members of the ‘Cohen circle’—nearly forgotten figures like August
Stadler, Adolf Elsas and Ferdinand August Müller—were meant to contribute to this debate. These
sometimes sophisticated analyses were in turn inspired by Cohen’s early attempt to use psychophysics’
conceptual tools to make sense of some of Kant’s obscure remarks about the intensive magnitude
of sensation in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
Michael Heidelberger, in his classic 1993 Fechner monograph (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. Ch. 6),
was the first to take the Marburg debate on psychophysics into consideration and to suggest its
importance for the formation of the early Cohen circle (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 124f.). However,
Heidelberger’s contribution, which is ‘hidden’ in a monumental investigation of Fechner’s work and
its reception, seems to have completely escaped the attention of historians of philosophy. The aim of
this paper is to fill what I think is a serious gap in the historical literature on Neo-Kantianism, which
has recently been enjoying a renewed interest, especially in the English-speaking world (Beiser, 2014;
Makkreel and Luft, 2009; Luft, 2015). Elsewhere (Giovanelli, 2016), I have analyzed in detail the role
played by Cohen’s 1883 ‘unsuccessful’ book on the history of the infinitesimal method, Das Princip
der Infinitesimal-Methode (Cohen, 1883), in shaping some of the fundamental tenets of the school
(in particular the intimate relation between transcendental philosophy and the history of science).
In the present paper, I aim to show that it was the early Marburg debate on psychophysics that,
in a sort of heterogony of ends, prompted Cohen’s interest in the history of higher analysis. This
paper is of course very much indebted to Heidelberger’s path-breaking contributions. However, by
considering the Marburg debate on psychophysics from the perspective of the history of the Marburg
school, rather than of Fechner’s reception, I hope I will throw a different light on the matter. In
particular, in my opinion, there is a missing piece in Heidelberger’s reconstruction of the puzzle:
Kant’s principle of the Anticipations of Perception (A, p. 166–176; B, p. 207–218). In my view, this
is the key element to understanding the entire debate. The Marburg interest in psychophysics arose
from Cohen’s early attempt at providing a psychophysical interpretation of Kant’s principle, and
then faded away when Cohen became convinced that this attempt had failed. It was at this point
that he ventured himself into a new interpretation exposed in Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode.
It was the stance towards Cohen’s ‘paradigm switch’ that determined the Cohen circle’s internal
dynamics, which, as we shall see, was more turbulent than it appears in Heidelberger’s presentation.
The narrative structure of the paper will be as follows. In the early 1870s, Cohen, in order
to make sense of Kant’s obscure principle of the Anticipations of Perception, initially resorted to
psychophysics’ parlance of the relation between stimulus and sensation (sec. 1). The few remarks
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that Cohen made on the subject encouraged his early followers (Stadler, Elsas and Müller) to
pursue an often technical analysis of Fechner’s psychophysics (sec. 2). In turn, Cohen, inspired
by these critiques, realized that psychophysics was not the proper framework for understanding
Kant’s Anticipations of Perception, which, he claimed, should be interpreted against the background
of the history of the infinitesimal calculus (sec. 3). On the one hand, Cohen’s ‘infinitesimal turn’
divided the early ‘Cohen circle’ into those ready to follow his new course and those who were taken
aback by his unorthodox approach to the calculus (sec. 4). On the other hand, Cohen’s Das Princip
der Infinitesimal-Methode paved the way for the ‘Marburg school’s’ interest in the historical fieri
of science (Natorp, 1912b). At the same time, however, this new course abruptly interrupted a
promising discussion in Marburg on the issue of ‘measurability’ in science, a discussion that Cohen
himself had somehow unwittingly inspired (sec. 5).
1. Anticipations of Perception and Psychophysics: Cohen and Stadler
In the first edition of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (Cohen, 1871), his first Kant monograph,
Cohen dedicates several lines to the principle of Anticipations of Perception, the second of the
synthetic principles enumerated by Kant in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In the second 1787
edition of the Kritik, the principle somewhat cryptically attributes an intensive magnitude to the
realitas phaenomenon—the ‘real’ that is the object of sensation. In the first 1781 edition the wording
was slightly different. Kant attributes an intensive magnitude to the sensation and to the real which
corresponds to it (A, p. 166). Noticing the difference between these two formulations of the principle,
Cohen commented: “What is the real as an object of simple sensation, as an intensive quantity, in
antithesis to an extensive?”: “it is the unity of the stimulus in which we objectify sensation” (Cohen,
1871, p. 215-216). Kant of course did not use the expression ‘unity of the stimulus’ (Cohen, 1871,
p. 217). However, Cohen was convinced that Kant’s insistence in the second edition of his opus
magnus on the ‘real’ that is the object of sensation, rather than on sensation itself, was motivated
by the need to find an objective correlate of sensation: “the intention [. . .] of clarifying the real as a
simple unity of the objectified stimulus seems to me to be the reason for modifying this affirmation
in the second edition” (Cohen, 1871, p. 216).
The language of the “physiology of the senses” (Cohen, 1871, p. 215) used by Cohen might
not mean much to today’s Kant scholar. In contrast, Cohen’s insight was enormously influential
among his early acolytes, a point that is rarely mentioned in the literature. Cohen’s readers at the
time probably immediately understood that Cohen’s parlance was a reference to Fechner’s (1860)
controversial attempt to measure the intensive magnitude of sensation in terms of its functional
relation to the stimulus. Similar wordings can be found in Cohen’s previous ‘Herbartian’ writings
(Cohen, 1868, p. 420f.). However, Cohen might have learned about this issue from Friedrich Albert
Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus (Lange, 1866). Lange, by discussing the relation between form
and content in Kant’s philosophy, mentions Fechner’s logarithmic formula for the relation between
the sensation, as the internal content of consciousness, and the “external (physical) stimulus” (Lange,
1866, p. 251f.).
From 1870 to 1872 Lange was professor of inductive philosophy in Zurich. It was one of his Zurich
students, August Stadler (1850–1910), who took up Cohen’s insights a few years later. Lange himself
had recommended Stadler to Cohen, the latter of which being an unknown Privatdozent in Berlin
at the time (cf. Cohen, 1910a). In Berlin, Stadler broadened his scientific outlook by following the
lectures of some of the great scientists of his time: Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil Du Bois Reymond
and Ernst Engel; in addition, he attended Cohen’s small seminar on the Kritik der reinen Vernunft
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(Cohen to Lange, May 14, 1873; Lange, 1968, p. 372). This seminar deeply influenced him. At the
end of 1873, Stadler finished writing a short but influential monograph on Kant’s teleology (Stadler,
1874), and by October 1875, had already finished a second book, in which he developed Cohen’s
insight on the transcendental meaning of the a priori (Stadler, 1876). Cohen, who in the meantime
had succeeded the prematurely deceased Lange in Marburg, immediately elaborated on Stadler’s
contributions in his 1876/77 book on Kant’s ethics (Cohen, 1877).
In his 1876 book, Stadler took an original stance towards Kant’s Anticipations of Perception.
Stadler, like Cohen, also read Kant’s second principle as a claim about the psychology of sensation.
However, Stadler was not convinced of the success of Kant’s attempt to deduce a priori the continuity
of the degree of sensation. Thus, he preferred to reformulate Kant’s second principle as what he
called the “principle of material connection” (Prinzip der materiellen Verknüpfung) (Stadler, 1876,
p. Ch. VIII). The principle indicates as an a priori condition the weaker claim that “all sensations
must possess an intensive magnitude” (Stadler, 1876, p. 65). All sensations must be “over the zero-
point of consciousness” (Stadler, 1876, p. 65) (that is there are no negative sensations), otherwise
the succession of sensations would be interrupted; as a consequence, the unity and identity of
consciousness would be compromised and no objectively valid experience would be possible. “Beyond
this,” Stadler pointed out, Kant took a further step “that I cannot follow” (Stadler, 1876, p. 145).
Kant claimed that the increase and decrease of the intensive magnitude of sensation is continuous.
Stadler “tried in vain to find a transcendental reason” for this claim, but he had to conclude that
“the Kritik leaves it unproven” (Stadler, 1876, p. 145). Whether or not the degree of sensation
varies continuously can at most be decided a posteriori, “through the investigation of the single
sensations” (Stadler, 1876, p. 72). However, Stadler would soon show that empirical investigations
about sensations, far from supporting Kant’s claim, actually refuted it.
At the time, nearly two decades after the publication of the Elemente der Psychophysik, the
debate about Fechner’s result, that physical and subjective intensity are related by a logarithmic
function, was alive as ever. In 1877, Fechner published In Sachen der Psychophysik (Fechner, 1877),
in which he defended himself from his numerous and often renowned critics: Hermann von Helmholtz
(1867), Ernst Mach (1863), Joseph Plateau (1872), Joseph Delbœuf (1873), Ewald Hering (1875),
Franz Brentano (1874) and others. Fechner’s attempt to measure sensation was based precisely on
the assumption that the degree of sensation varies continuously along with the continuous variation
of the stimulus. It was this assumption that Stadler wanted to challenge, which, he claimed, Fechner’s
opponents had not called into question. In February 1878, he finished a brief paper entitled “Über
die Ableitung des Psychophysischen Gesetzes,” which was published in Philosophische Monatshefte
in the same year (Stadler, 1878). In contrast to e.g. Delbœuf (1878), Stadler did not want to deny
the quantitative aspect of sensation, but rather to challenge the empirical adequacy of Fechner’s
logarithmic formula. We shall roughly follow Stadler’s derivation of the latter. Although Stadler’s
procedure is similar, though not identical to Fechner’s, it remained the model of similar derivations
presented by the Marburg group. Throughout this paper, I will follow Stadler (who in turn follows
Fechner himself) and indicate the variable corresponding to sensation with γ, and that corresponding
to the stimulus with β.
Initially Fechner introduced his formula speculatively in the second Appendix of his Zend-Avesta
(Fechner, 1851, p. 373–386; cf. Scheerer, 1987). However, later, in his Elemente der Psychophysik
(Fechner, 1860), he presented it as based on Weber’s experimental results, in particular those con-
cerning the sensation of weight and touch (Weber, 1834; Weber, 1846). On the basis of numerous
trials on pairwise comparisons of weights, Weber found that subjects do not perceive the absolute
difference between them but the ratio of difference to the initial weight. If a one-ounce weight is
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placed in our hand, we can easily perceive it; however, if two weights of, say, 32 and 33 ounces are
compared, we do not perceive the one-ounce difference between them; the ratio 1/33 is too small to
be discerned. The same can be said for the difference between eye-estimated lengths, sound pitches,
etc. Weber’s findings can be summarized in the formula:
∆β
β
= c (i)
The constant c depends on the different senses (touch, hearing, etc). In this formulation of Weber’s
results, there is no mention of sensation. In order to establish a functional relation between sensation
and stimulus, Fechner made a further assumption. He postulated that the ‘difference sensation’
(Unterschiedsemempfindung) or ‘contrast sensation’ (Contrastempfindung)—which arises when the
difference of two stimuli becomes ‘just noticeable’—is proportional to the ‘sensation difference’
(Empfindungsunterschied), the difference between the two corresponding sensations (Fechner, 1860,
p. 2:85). This assumption is nothing but the psychophysical analogon of the definition of equal
temperature differences in terms of equal volumes of expansion in the theory of heat (Tannery, 1875a;
Tannery, 1875b). To put it more precisely: if the just-noticeable stimulus-increase with respect to
the original stimulus is constant ∆β/β = c, then the corresponding ‘difference sensation’ is constant
∆γ = c′. Setting c = kc′, the ‘just-noticeable differences’ between stimuli (j.n.d.) might be used as
a unit of measurement; the number of sensation differences ∆γ between two stimuli is k times the
number of j.n.d. ∆β/β between them. In this way one can write Weber’s experimental findings in
the form of a functional relation between stimulus and sensation:
∆γ = k∆β
β
where k = c
′
c
(ii)
Notice that this equation does not appear in Fechner’s writings (see below in sec. 4.3). In Stadler’s
reconstruction, however, Fechner started from this equation and postulated that it is valid for every
change of sensation, however small; that is, it is also valid for the so-called ‘unconscious sensations’
that are caused by a stimulus which is not sufficient to raise them to consciousness (e.g., the increase
from 32 to 33 ounces). Fechner appealed to what he called an “a priori valid mathematical auxiliary
principle [Hülfsprincip]” (Fechner, 1860, p. 40): what is true for finite differences ought to also be
true in the limit. Then he substituted the finite increments ∆β and ∆γ with the infinitesimally
small increments dβ and dγ. The simple relation (ii) between two units of measure turned into an
informative differential equation, the so-called Fundamentalformel:
dγ = kdβ
β
(iii)
The next step was to derive an integral formula containing an expression for the measurement
of sensation. This is a matter of more or less elementary differential and integral calculus. One first
calculates the indefinite integral of eq. (iii) (i.e., without upper and lower limits):∫
dγ =
∫
k
dβ
β
+ Const (iv)
By consulting a table of integrals one can easily find that the integral of a fraction whose
numerator is the differential of the denominator is the ‘natural’ logarithm (that is, a logarithm with
base e = 2.7182 . . . ) of the denominator:
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γ = k ln β + Const (v)
To eliminate the constant of integration one evaluates the integral between definite limits. Fechner
chooses as the lower limit γ = 0, where the sensation begins (that is it becomes conscious) and
disappears and the correspondent β0, that is, the threshold of stimulus below which there is no
perception: ∫ γ
γ0
dγ =
∫ β
β0
k
dβ
β
(vi)
The sensation γ—ormore precisely the difference of two sensations γ0−γ which corresponds to the
differences of two stimuli β−β0—can be measured as the definite integral, that is, as a summation of
infinitesimally small sensation increments dγ which corresponds to the summation of infinitely small
stimuli increments dβ. According to eq. (v) this is of course equivalent to γ − γ0 = ln β − ln β0. For
a well-known logarithmic identity, the difference of the logarithms of two numbers is the logarithm
of their ratio. Thus Fechner’s final equation is the following:
γ = k ln β
β0
(vii)
Sensation γ is not simply the logarithm of the stimulus β, but of the latter expressed in terms of
its threshold value β0, the first unit stimulus, from which the zero point where the sensation begins
and disappears (Fechner, 1860, p. 2:13). After the initial value (β0) and the unit of measurement
(β0 = 1) have been specified, sensation can then be measured as a cumulation of j.n.d. Thus,
Fechner’s formula is both a ‘law of nature’ and a ‘measurement formula’ at the same time (cf.
Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 206; Heidelberger, 1993).
After roughly presenting Fechner’s derivation in this way, Stadler pointed to a simple but serious
conceptual difficulty that it entails. According to Weber’s findings, if one imagines the stimulus
gradually increasing from a weight of, say, 32 ounces to twice that, then not all of the infinite
possible values between 32 and 64 ounces can be perceived, rather only those for which the eq. (i)
or ∆β = cβ holds. We can perceive the difference between, say, 32 and 42 ounces, but not between
32 and 33 ounces: “not every ∆β corresponds to a variation of the sensation, rather ∆γ remains
zero for all values ∆β > c · β” (Stadler, 1878, p. 219). When Fechner, relying on his mathematical
auxiliary principle, introduced eq. (iii)—that is, he substituted finite differences ∆β and ∆γ with
infinitesimally small ones dβ and dγ—he contradicted Weber’s results rather than building on them.
Of course this objection is valid only if one equates sensation with conscious sensations, as Stadler
explicitly does. In this case one can claim that Weber’s experiments have shown that no sensation
change ∆γ corresponds to a very small stimulus variation ∆β = dβ: “Weber’s law is an empirical
law and it is valid only for the real, empirically given sensations, and not so-called unconscious
ones” (Stadler, 1878, p. 220). As a consequence, we are not allowed to “represent the reciprocal
correlation of the stimulus and of the sensation through a continuous function or a curve” (Stadler,
1878, p. 220). In Fechner’s conception, stimulus and sensation are related by the natural exponential
function γ = eβ . Such a function can be plotted on a Cartesian coordinate system by a smooth
curve (looking like half a parabola) which increases dramatically over its domain, since γ increases
faster as β increases: equal units on a sensation scale correspond to progressively greater units on
an external physical scale. However, according to Weber’s findings, if we represent a small variation
of the stimulus (∆β < c) on the x-axis, then no variation of the sensation (∆γ) would correspond
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on the y-axis: “The sensation progression,” in Stadler’s words, “then has the form of a stair with
steps of increasing width” (Stadler, 1878, p. 220).
“The essence of the relation between ∆β and ∆γ,” as Stadler summarized his critique of psy-
chophysics, “is discontinuity. The logarithmic curves, with which one attempts to represent the
psycho-physical law, lack empirical truth” (Stadler, 1878, p. 223). However one might judge this
technical result, its philosophical implications seem hard to fathom at first. However, the philosoph-
ical intent of Stadler’s critique of Fechner became more perspicuous in a paper Stadler finished
in June of 1880 and published in the same year in the Philosophische Monatshefte, “Das Gesetz
der Stetigkeit bei Kant” (Stadler, 1880). Stadler showed that Kant had an ambiguous attitude on
the question of the continuity of the intensive magnitude. In the Anticipations of Perception, Kant
claims that the intensive magnitude of sensation is continuous only in the weak sense, that between
every degree and nothing, one can always think of another arbitrary possible smaller degree. Nothing
can be said about the continuous increasing or decreasing of the variation of degree, which is an
empirical question (B, p. 212–213). However, in the Beweis of the second Analogy of Experience,
Kant seems to defend the stronger claim, that the intensive magnitude of sensation arises from 0
to a certain degree in a continuous manner, running through all actual intermediate degrees (B,
p. 255–256).
At first sight, Stadler’s paper seems to lack theoretical ambition, and it is based on a detailed
textual analysis of Kant’s passages on continuity. However, though “only in passing,” he does note
“that modern psychology has not offered any reason to reshape Kant’s concept of the degree of sensa-
tion” (Stadler, 1880, p. 585). Modern psychophysics does not permit any a posteriori demonstration
of what Kant attempted in vain to demonstrate a priori. Psychophysics postulates that the process
of the emergence of a sensation runs through all intermediate degrees, even if this passage is so rapid
that it remains unnoticed. However—and this was the result of Stadler’s 1878 paper—this postulate,
far from being valid a a priori as Fechner claimed, can probably be proven wrong a posteriori:
“as far as intensity is concerned, in my opinion, psycho-physical research has instead shown the
discontinuity in psychical transition in relation to the continuous growth of the stimulus” (Stadler,
1880, p. 585–586). Experience seems to show that the stimulus, e.g., a weight, can be increased to a
certain degree without causing any change in the corresponding concious sensation.
Cohen seems to have immediately appreciated Stadler’s result. In a letter to Stadler on February
24, 1881 Cohen claimed that he now “fully agreed” with his “‘Stetigkeit’” (that is, Stadler, 1880).
However, he added: “I have outlined a formulation of the Anticipation in which your previous
concerns seem to be acknowledged and at the same time eliminated” (Cohen to Stadler, Feb. 24,
1881; Cohen, 2015, p. 128–129; my emphasis). This only recently published letter is central to my
account. It shows that a fundamental ‘paradigm shift’ happened at this point. On the one hand,
Cohen recognized that Stadler’s objections against Kant’s a priori deduction of the continuity of
the degree of sensation were justified. On the other hand, one can surmise that at that time Cohen
probably started to realize that Kant’s Anticipations of Perception should be understood from a quite
different perspective, outside the framework of psychophysics. We do not have further information
on what exactly Cohen had in mind. His next letter to Stadler is dated months later in October and
includes the first mention of “our new Privatdozent Dr. Natorp”; in particular, Cohen announced
the latter’s new writing “which is thorough a[nd] clear” (Cohen to Stadler, Oct. 30, 1881; Cohen,
2015, p. 131). Paul Natorp’s habilitation thesis on Descartes (later published as Natorp, 1882a) had
just been accepted and he had given his inaugural lecture on Leibniz a few days earlier (Natorp,
1881). Natorp’s early works in Marburg revealed that Cohen was reorienting the interests of his
‘circle’ towards the ‘prehistory of criticism’ and its connection to the history of science (Natorp,
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1882b; Natorp, 1882c). In particular, Cohen might have already realized that the Anticipations of
Perception should be understood not in the context of the epistemology of empirical psychology, but
by investigating the historical roots of Kant’s principle in the development of modern mathematics
and physics.
2. Elsas, Müller and the Early Cohen Circle in Marburg
That Cohen initially attempted to interpret Kant’s second principle against the background of
Fechner’s psychophysics might surprise today’s Kant scholars. However, this approach was part of
a vast ‘research program’ which Cohen put forward just after he succeeded the deceased Lange in
Marburg, becoming the first Jewish philosophy full professor at a German university. According to
the guideline of the Prussian Kultusministerium, the philosophy faculty in Marburg used to offer
scientific Preisaufgaben (essay prizes) with the intent of supporting students (Sieg, 1994, p. 130f.).
The ‘call for papers’ launched by Cohen for the 1880/1881 prize (cf. Holzhey, 1986a, p. 1:381f.)
required the candidate to “[e]xplain Kant’s mathematical principles”; the first principle, the Axioms
of Intuition with reference to “the new science of space,” that is, non-Euclidean geometry; “the
second principle,” the Anticipations of Perception, “should be evaluated with respect to the problem
of psychophysics” (cit. in Holzhey, 1986a, p. 1:382; my emphasis).
The recipient of the prize was the physicist Adolf Elsas (1855–1895), who, after his dissertation
written under Helmholtz’s guidance in Berlin (Elsas, 1881), was working as an assistant at the Mar-
burg physical-mathematical institute. In his referee report, Cohen praised Elsas’ secure knowledge
of Kant’s philosophy (Sieg, 1994, p. 131). Concerning the treatment of Kant’s first principle, Cohen
appreciated Elsas’ ability to grasp the philosophical implications of “the Riemmann-Helmholtz spec-
ulations” beyond technicalities; with regard to the second principle, Cohen recognized that Elsas
presented “the correct point of view for the appreciation of the psychophysical problem” (cit. in
Holzhey, 1986a, p. 23f., fn. 86).
The question of the measurability of psychical magnitudes was hotly debated among philosophers
at that time. An influential scholar like the great historian of Greek philosophy (and proto-neo-
Kantian) Eduard Zeller, had just published a discussion of the issue in the proceedings of the Prussian
Academy of Science (Zeller, 1881). The dissertation of Ferdinand August Müller (1858–1888), of
which Cohen was the main supervisor, further testifies that this was one of the main philosophical
concerns in Marburg. In his Gutachten, Cohen emphasized that, after Stadler’s technical objection
against Fechner’s law, Müller was able to show “that in the very problem of establishing a functional
relation between stimulus and sensation there is an epistemological mistake” (cit. in Holzhey, 1986a,
p. 1:22f.).
In October 1881, Müller finished transforming his dissertation into the booklet Das Axiom der
Psychophysik (F. A. Müller, 1882). The title refers to the fact that Müller distinguished the ‘axiom
of psychophysics’, that is, Fechner’s claim that there is a functional relationship between stimulus
and sensation, and the ‘problem of psychophysics ’, the search for the particular form that such a
functional relationship actually assumes (e.g., logarithmic law, power law, etc.). Instead of attacking
Fechner’s solution of the problem as Stadler had done, Müller wanted to strike the heart of Fechner’s
enterprise by questioning the very idea that a functional relationship exists at all.
Müller recognized the importance of Stadler’s critique of Fechner’s law. “Such a sharp objection,”
he wrote “would alone be capable of overthrowing Fechner’s entire construction of formulas [Formel-
gebäude]” (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 23), if the latter were based exclusively on Weber’s result, that is,
only on the ‘method of just-noticeable differences’. However, Müller argued, “[t]his is not the case”
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(F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 23). Beyond the experiments that concern the just-noticeable differences, one
must take into account the ‘method of more-than-noticeable differences’ or the method of bisection.
Müller showed that Delbœuf’s (1873) repetition of Joseph Plateau’s (1872) experiments on color
differences allow dividing an initial interval between two largely different perceived magnitudes of a
sensation into equal subintervals. Once equally-appearing intervals are defined, according to Müller,
Fechner could introduce the hypothesis expressed by Weber’s fraction (ii). Müller argued that if one
accepts this hypothesis, as Stadler did, then “the passage to the fundamental formula containing
the infinitely small values dβ and dγ is irreproachable” (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 25).
Müller’s defense of Fechner’s derivation (see however Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 215f.) was of
course meant to strategically shift the attention to a more fundamental question. The shortcomings
of psychophysics are not physical-mathematical, but, as Müller put it, ‘transcendental’. Müller uses
the term ‘transcendental’ according to the interpretation that Cohen had laid down a few years
earlier in the first part of his book on Kant’s ethics (Cohen, 1877). As is well known, in Cohen’s view,
Kant’s ‘transcendental method’ proceeds bottom-up from the ‘fact’ of the mathematical science of
nature as it is historically given in the ‘printed books’, to the conditions of its possibility (cf. Cohen,
1877, p. 77). The same approach must be applied to psychophysics. Quantitative psychologists
assumed as a ‘fact’ that the psychological attributes which they aspired to measure are quantitative.
However, this alleged fact must be transformed into a ‘problem’, and its possibility must be carefully
evaluated.
Müller’s considerations, unfortunately, presuppose that the reader has already bought into quite
a lot of Kant’s philosophy. In particular, not surprisingly, Cohen’s early interpretation of the Antic-
ipations of Perception plays a major part in Müller’s line of argument. Müller conceded that Kant’s
two formulations of the principle are confusing to say the least. Does Kant claim that sensation has
intensive magnitude, or the real, which is the object of sensation, or both? “The relations between
sensation and the real, which corresponds to it in the object, is not expressed with full clarity” (F. A.
Müller, 1882, p. 51). In Müller’s view, Cohen had made a fundamental step toward solving the riddle:
“by defining the real that corresponds to sensation in the object as ‘stimulus’, Cohen developed in
a highly significant way Kant’s doctrine of the intensive magnitudes” (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 55).
On the one hand, Cohen obtained a hermeneutic elucidation of Kant’s different formulation of the
Anticipations of Perception in the two editions of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft; on the other hand,
he provided an epistemological clarification of the ambiguous notion of ‘stimulus’. The stimulus does
not arouse or cause sensation, the stimulus is the object of sensation or it is the objectified sensation
(F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 53). The main consequence of Cohen’s approach, in Müller’s view, is that it
is not the sensation which has intensive magnitude, nor the sensation and the stimulus, but only
the stimulus.
According to Müller, “physics measures intensive magnitudes and it is therefore the task of
physics to measure the magnitude of the stimulus” (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 55). Using a Bunsen’s
grease-spot photometer, for instance, one can establish that the illuminance of the photometer screen
due to the source S located a distance d from the photometer is equal to the illuminance of the screen
due to the source S′ located a distance d′ from the screen when the grease spot on the photometer’s
screen becomes invisible (S : d2 = S′ : d′2). After choosing a luminous intensity of a standard candle
(Normalkerze) as a unit, it is possible to construct the luminous intensity scale with equally spaced
units along the scale. Then one can establish “how many standard candles at the same distance one
would need to obtain the same effect as the light that we want to measure” (F. A. Müller, 1882,
p. 54). Using a Kantian terminology (B, p. 201f., fn.), Müller claimed that intensive magnitudes
can be measured through a ‘coalition’ of parts, rather than through ‘aggregation’ as in the case of
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extensive magnitudes (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 54f.).
In Müller’s reconstruction, Fechner attempted to achieve something analogous for the intensity of
sensation. As we have mentioned, the trick was to postulate that the ‘difference sensation’ or ‘contrast
sensation’ (Contrastempfindung) for two stimuli (the just-noticeable relative increase in stimulus),
was proportional to the ‘sensation difference’ (Empfindungsunterschied) (the difference between the
two corresponding sensations). However, Müller objected, this has the “absurd” implication that
equal stimuli would produce no sensation (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 106); but even if one sets aside
this issue, there is still no proof that the proportionality postulated by Fechner holds (F. A. Müller,
1882, p. 18). However, without this assumption sensation intensities cannot be transformed into a
class of measurable intensities. Instead of speaking of ‘contrast sensations’ which vary according
to their intensity, Müller concluded, we can at most speak of ‘contrast feelings’ (Contrastgefühle)
that vary according to their character (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. IV, 104, 106). In other terms, the
equality and difference among, say, luminosities can be organized only in a nominal scale assigning
different names to different types of ‘contrast feelings’ (say, dark, shadowy, bright, luminescent, etc.;
cf. Philippi, 1883, p. 585ff. see F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 106–115, for more sophisticated examples).
Thus, contrary to Fechner’s ambitions, Müller believed himself to have shown that “sensation
cannot be expressed in numbers at all,” i.e., it cannot be measured (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 58). The
stimulus can be measured, but one can speak of the magnitude of sensation only in a figurative sense.
As a consequence, no functional relationship can be established between them. Fechner’s indirect
scaling method, in which the sensation differences are measured by putting j.n.d in a row between
stimuli becomes powerless (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 58). The conclusion is of course that the axiom
of psychophysics, the very claim that a functional relationship exists between the magnitude of
sensation and the magnitude of the stimulus, is flawed: “sensation is not a function of the stimulus,
but the stimulus is the object of sensation” (F. A. Müller, 1882, p. 56).
Müller’s epistemological reflections constitute only a relatively small portion of the book. The
latter includes further detailed analyses of Weber’s and Charles Delezenne’s (1826) experiments
(II.1 and II.2), of Helmholtz’s (1877) analysis of sound sensations (II.3–5), of Georg Elias Müller’s
(1878) development of the right or wrong cases method (III.1), Delbœuf’s (1873) measurement of
fatigue (III.2), and Hering’s (1875) work on spatial and temporal sensations (III.1). This material
cannot be considered here. What is relevant in this context is that Müller displayed a solid technical
knowledge of the topic. Thus, Fechner himself took the time to reply to the “mathematically as well
as philosophically trained author” (Fechner, 1882, p. 324).
In 1882, Fechner published Revision der Hauptpuncte der Psychophysik (Fechner, 1882), a newly
articulated defense of psychophysics against an apparently never ending series of new critics, including
several philosophers like Zeller (1881, 1882) and Johannes von Kries (1882). If Zeller insisted that
sensation magnitudes cannot be measured in practice, von Kries thought that they cannot be
measured in principle; Müller, as we have seen, raised the more radical ‘quantity objection’ that
there are no sensation magnitudes at all (cf. eg. Michell, 1999, p. 40ff.). Against Müller’s argument
“from Kantian principles” (Fechner, 1882, p. 325), Fechner pointed out that no one can deny that
sensations of the same type (light, acoustic, etc.) can be said to become stronger or weaker. Müller
can regard ‘contrast sensations’ or sensation differences as mere ‘contrast feelings’, if he wants
to. However, Fechner believed himself to have shown that if one defines ‘sensation differences’ as
proportional to “difference sensations,” one can achieve measurements that are empirically correct.
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“What should I care about Kantian definitions” (Fechner, 1882, p. 325), he concluded.2 Müller is
correct in claiming that quantities can be compared only via a unit of measure: “and exactly in this
way my measurement formula measures sensation, even if not directly, but through the mediation
of its functional relations with the stimuli” (Fechner, 1882, p. 326).
In his review of Müller’s book, Elsas (1883a)—who in the meantime had become Privatdozent
in Marburg (Elsas, 1882)—defends his Marburg colleague on this point. If sensation intensities are
ordinal (weaker and stronger), this does not mean that they are measurable, that a certain sensation
is five or six time stronger than another one. Neither this measurability of a quantity can be inferred
from the fact that it is set in functional relation to a measurable quantity. For instance, the welfare
of a nation depends, say, on its morality (Sittlichkeit); if one concedes that the former is measurable,
this does not mean that the latter is too (Elsas, 1883a, p. 130-131). Fechner’s objection to Müller,
according to Elsas, reveals that the problem was much deeper. Fechner and his followers should
undertake a serious discussion to establish what a ‘measurable magnitude’ is in general (Elsas, 1883a,
p. 131). Physics could be successful for a long time without raising this question, but empirical
psychology made an epistemological analysis of the issue unavoidable.
Elsas’s review is worth mentioning because it reveals the background against which this issue was
understood within the ‘Cohen circle’. According to Elsas—who was probably summarizing the results
of his prize essay—Kant’s transcendental question about the possibility of mathematics and physics
should be extended to the new sciences that were gaining ground in the second half of the 19th century.
“Is metageometry, is psychophysics a possible science?” (Elsas, 1883a, p. 127). The issue, as Cohen has
shown, is not a physio-psychological one; the origin of the representation of space or the organization
of our sensibility are not at stake. The question is, “on which transcendental foundations (that is,
on which conditions making the knowledge possible) is the necessity of mathematical knowledge
based?” Müller, embracing “Cohen’s conception of the transcendental” (Elsas, 1883a, p. 127), has
ventured to submit psychophysics to such a critical investigation.
In mathematics and physics we establish functional relationships among magnitudes. The stim-
ulus is clearly a magnitude that can be measured. “Can the sensation also be measured? Yes or
no? The answer to this simple question decides the possibility of psychophysics” (Elsas, 1883a,
p. 130). Despite providing an overall positive review of the book, Elsas however did not fully agree
with Müller’s philosophical conclusions. Elsas, like Müller, subscribed to Cohen’s identification of
Kant’s ‘real which corresponds to sensation’ with the ‘stimulus’. However, Elsas denied that one can
attribute an intensive magnitude to the stimulus: “Physics measures intensities only as extensive
magnitudes; the intensity of a physical phenomenon, e.g. of sound, of a light source, of a force is
never an intensive magnitude” (Elsas, 1883a, p. 133). Intensive magnitudes are measurable only
indirectly through their extensive effects.3
3. Cohen: From Psychophysics to the History of the Infinitesimal Method
When Elsas published his review of Müller’s book, Cohen had already come to the conclusion
that his interpretation of the Anticipations of Perception, in which the ‘real’ was identified with the
stimulus of psychophysics, was not satisfying. Psychophysics was simply not the right framework
for making sense Kant’s Anticipations of Perception. As we have mentioned, at the beginning
2For the importance of Fechner’s answer to Müller, cf. Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 240.
3This is, by the way, a quite Kantian point of view, see, e.g. Ak., p. 18:322; 28:425.
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of 1881, Cohen wrote to Stadler that he envisaged a way to acknowledge, and at the same time
overcome, the latter’s objection that, contrary to Kant’s claim, the degree of sensation probably
varies discontinuously. The most reliable, though indirect, source at our disposal for concretely
understanding what Cohen had in mind is probably Stadler’s then-new monograph, Kants Theorie
der Materie (Stadler, 1883)—possibly the first monograph on Kant’s Metaphysische Anfangsgründe
der Naturwissenschaft (Kant, 1786).
Stadler still fully works within the framework built by Cohen and discussed by the early Cohen
circle. As Stadler writes, “Cohen, very happily, called ‘stimulus’ the objective correlate of the intensive
magnitude” (Stadler, 1883, p. 60). The magnitude that corresponds to the stimulus of the intensive
magnitude of sensation would thus be called the “magnitude of the stimulus” (Stadler, 1883, p. 60).
Stadler agreed with Müller that “only the stimulus can be measured, not sensation”; however, this
did not mean that “intensive magnitude can only be attributed to the stimulus,” as Müller claimed
(Stadler, 1883, p. 248, n. 24). For Stadler, only sensation has intensive magnitude, but this is an
internal psychological determination, which “in its own nature is not measurable” (Stadler, 1883,
p. 61). Stadler agreed with Elsas that intensive magnitudes are measurable only through their causal
product of extensive ones.
Stadler attempted to apply these conceptual tools to Kant’s work, giving of a sort of psychophys-
ical interpretation of some of the key elements of his philosophy. Kant’s Gegebenwerden and the
Afficirtwerden can be interpreted as, in a first approximation, the “representation of the dependence
of the change of sensation on the outside” (Stadler, 1883, p. 53); more precisely this dependence—
“which today one would call psychophysical” (Stadler, 1883, p. 58)—means “the emergence of a
degree of consciousness, an intensive magnitude” (Stadler, 1883, p. 59). The objective correlate of
the intensive magnitude, as suggested by Cohen, is the ‘stimulus’. In Stadler’s view, the stimulus of
sensation should ultimately be thought of as motion. This is what Kant meant when he claimed that
the object of the external senses must be motion “because only thereby [through motion] can these
senses be affected” (Ak., p. 4:477). The differences between sense qualities should be ultimately
dissolved in the differences between motions. In Stadler’s reading, this is nothing but “the principle
of physiology that all external stimuli of the sensations must be motions” (Stadler, 1883, p. 8), which,
through the peripheral nervous system are passed to the central nervous system (cf. Stadler, 1878,
p. 223; see also Wundt, 1874, p. 277).
Stadler notices further that, in the Beweis of the Anticipations of Perception, Kant used the
expression ‘moment’ to indicate the “reality as cause” and, in particular, as the “cause of sensation,”
as something that exerts an influence on the senses (B, p. 211). ‘Moment’ is for Kant the ‘moment
of acceleration,’ an infinitely small variation of velocity. According to Stadler, the term ‘moment’
reveals that what Kant called “‘influence on the senses’, the ‘stimulus’” (Stadler, 1883, p. 60) is
nothing but the effect on what in physics we call ‘force’. The “moment is the magnitude of the force
that corresponds to the intensive magnitude of the sensation” (Stadler, 1883, p. 60). The magnitude
of the force and intensive magnitude are correlated, but not identical. Force can be measured only
through its extensive effects. The intensive magnitude is given in consciousness, it is a “subjective
evaluation” of the stimulus, and cannot be measured (Stadler, 1883, p. 61).
Stadler conceded that there are passages where Kant seems to attribute intensive magnitude
not to sensation, but to physical determinations like ‘velocity’ (cf. Ak., p. 4:540–541). However,
he claimed, one should resist confusing this intensive magnitude with the intensive magnitude of
sensation. According to Stadler, Kant “did not want to identify it [the intensive magnitude of
velocity] at all with the intensive magnitude, which corresponds to reality” (Stadler, 1883, p. 37;
in the sense of the category of reality). The definition of the velocity as an intensive magnitude,
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Stadler pointed out, was only an analogy used to emphasize that the magnitude of velocity is not
composed of parts, as the magnitude of space and time is.
Stadler took some pains to interpret away the passages that could support the opposite reading.
E.g., he comments on Kant’s reflection with the title ‘Über das Moment der Geschwindigkeit im
Anfangsaugenblick des Falls’ (Ak., p. 14: Refl. 67; 1788-1791). Here Kant attributes an ‘intensive
magnitude’ to the ‘moment of velocity’—that is, the tendency to fall downward at the beginning of a
falling motion—and conceives of the finite motion as a summation of infinitely many ‘moments’ (Ak.,
p. 14:495; Refl. 67). Stadler warned that one should not try to read passages like these as Kant’s
attempt to provide a foundation for the “objective validity of the differential calculus” (Stadler,
1883, p. 39). Interpreters committed to such a reading “would be in contradiction with the view
that Kant expressed of the infinitesimal method” (Stadler, 1883, p. 39). In general, in Kant’s work,
continuity means infinite possibility of division, not composition from actual, though infinitely small
parts. Stadler concludes polemically that, “those who make the intensive magnitude correspond
with the differential confuse the form with the content” (Stadler, 1883, p. 39).
Although Stadler never mentioned Cohen explicitly, Cohen himself later read this last claim in
particular as being directed towards his upcoming book (Cohen, 1910a). Stadler’s monograph was
finished in March (Stadler, 1883, p. IV). According to Cohen’s later recollections, Stadler stayed
in Marburg in the summer of 1883 while Cohen was working on his Das Princip der Infinitesimal-
Methode (Cohen, 1883). The Vorwort of Cohen’s book is dated August 1883 (Cohen, 1883), but
the book was sent to print only in mid-October (Cohen to Natorp, Sep. 27, 1883; CN, p. Br. 1,
148). Reading the drafts of their books, Stadler and Cohen probably realized that one of them
put forward precisely what the other vehemently rejected. By that time, Cohen had completely
abandoned the framework of psychophysics, which had enjoyed so much success among his acolytes.
He became convinced that Kant’s second principle could be understood precisely by looking at
the connection between the concepts of ‘moment’, ‘intensive magnitude’ and ‘reality’, which was
suggested by the Kant passages mentioned by Stadler. According to Cohen, by establishing this
connection, Kant had expressed philosophically in his principle of Anticipations of Perception the
problem that Galilei, Leibniz and Newton had tried to answer mathematically when they introduced
a new type of quantities, namely, ‘infinitesimally small quantities’.
I cannot enter into the details here of this highly obscure book and its tormented reception,
which I have described in detail elsewhere (Giovanelli, 2016). What I would like to emphasize is
that Cohen explicitly recognized that it was Stadler’s critique of a possible psychophysical reading
of Kant’s Anticipations of Perception that changed his mind: to understand “what was new and
valuable in Kant’s conception of the intensive magnitude,” Cohen wrote, it was necessary to become
aware of “the deficiencies in its foundation and presentation, which A. Stadler had first emphasized”
(Cohen, 1883, p. 105). Stadler showed the failure of psychophysics’ attempt to present the intensive
magnitude of sensation as the differential dγ (Cohen, 1883, p. 159–160).4 Cohen, however, at the turn
of the 1880s, must have come to realize that what psychophysics had failed to achieve in the case
of sensation could still be established on another basis. The intensive magnitude of sensation was
not at stake in Kant’s Anticipations of Perception, but rather the intensive magnitude of physical
determinations such as ‘velocity’. It was in the attempt to give a mathematical counterpart to
the intensive magnitude of velocity that the ‘differential’ was introduced. Kant’s principle was the
4See cf. Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 222f. for more on Cohen’s critique of psychophysics in Das Princip der
Infinitesimal-Methode. In my perspective, the interesting part of the story is the role psychophysics played in Cohen’s
work before this book was written.
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philosophical expression of this historical fact.
The passage from one interpretative framework to the other seems to be based more on an
association of ideas than on a proper argument. However, the role played by the discussion of
psychophysics is confirmed by Cohen’s own reconstruction of the path that led him to rethink the
interpretation of Kant’s second principle in the revised and greatly augmented edition of his Kants
Theorie der Erfahrung (Cohen, 1885), which was finished in August 1885. Cohen recalls that “[i]n
the first edition of this book” (cf. Cohen, 1871, p. 46), he had attempted to identify the ‘real’ which
corresponds to sensation with “the ‘unity of stimulus, in which we objectify sensation’” (Cohen, 1885,
p. 436). However, he now recognized that “this expression, although useful to encourage further
reflections, was too psychological to be maintained” (Cohen, 1885, p. 436). What is at stake is
not “the unit of stimulus”, but the “the unit of motion” (Cohen, 1885, p. 436). It is precisely in
those passages mentioned by Stadler that Kant, by establishing a relation between reality, intensive
magnitude, and the mathematical/physical concept of ‘moment’, expresses the very problem that
the ‘discoverers’ of the infinitesimal calculus had to solve to make motion an object of scientific
inquiry: “Consequently Galilei and Leibniz talk of the infinitely small as an intensive magnitude”
(Cohen, 1885, p. 427). Kant, Cohen claims, does not even have to emphasize this connection since
it was obvious to his readers (Cohen, 1883, p. 105).
Again Cohen recognized that it was Stadler’s work on psychophysics that led him to completely
rethink his own interpretation of the Anticipations of Perception. In Cohen’s words, Stadler “rightly
opposes the continuity of sensation as an a priori determination” (Cohen, 1885, p. 437). Not only is
there no ‘pure transcendental foundation’ for the continuity of sensation; Stadler also demonstrated
that empirical studies on the psychology of sensation are even less capable of demonstrating a
posteriori that sensation grows in a continuous way. However, Stadler “only looks for the pure
transcendental foundation he is missing in the sensation” (Cohen, 1885, p. 437). He did not realize
that “the ‘pure transcendental foundation’” he was looking for cannot be found “in the sensation,
but only for the sensation” (Cohen, 1885, p. 437; my emphasis). That transcendental ground should
be found “in the new and autonomous mode of magnitude, which in the infinitesimal method reveals
itself to be fruitful for the constitution of the object in his mechanical meaning” (Cohen, 1885,
p. 437). In other words, Stadler still thought that psychophysics offered the conceptual framework
for understanding the problem Kant was facing. According to Cohen, however, this framework
was inadequate for understanding Kant’s concept of the “intensive”: “the so-called intensity of
sensation must absolutely be distinct from the intensive magnitude or reality of sensation” (Cohen,
1883, p. 156).
Elsas, in his 1885 review of Stadler’s 1883 book (Elsas, 1885b), points out clearly where Stadler was
no longer in accordance with Cohen’s new approach to Kant’s second principle. Stadler considered
“motion as the stimulus of sensation” (Elsas, 1885b, p. 146); according to Elsas, however—even if
there is some textual evidence to apply this psychological interpretation to Kant—the central point
is different: transcendental philosophy should try to explain what makes general mechanics a science
and thus what makes ‘motion’ a legitimate object of scientific inquiry: “The task is to explain the
fact of science, the fact of general mechanics” (Elsas, 1885b, p. 146). The relation between motion
and sensation is philosophically secondary, if not irrelevant. “Maybe the author should have further
developed the concept of intensive magnitude and its relation to the category of reality” (Elsas,
1885b, p. 146); “the elementary concepts of mechanics,” Elsas continues alluding to Cohen’s work,
“already offer some indication in this direction” (Elsas, 1885b, p. 146).
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4. The Dissolution of the Cohen Circle
Stadler’s publication rate fell drastically in the ensuing years, possibly for health reasons, and
we do not have textual evidence of his possible counter-objections. However, we know that he never
agreed with Cohen’s new course, even if he himself unwittingly had brought it about; their friendship,
however, never suffered (Cohen, 1910a). Elsas continued to publish, as a physicist (Elsas, 1883b; Elsas,
1885a; Elsas, 1886c; Elsas, 1887), a reviewer of philosophical publications (Elsas, 1884; Elsas, 1885b)
and as a high quality science popularizer (Elsas, 1886a). Moreover, after Fechner’s 1882 Revision
der Hauptpuncte der Psychophysik (Fechner, 1882), Elsas returned to psychophysics; in 1886 he
published his philosophical reflections on the topic in a little pamphlet, Über die Psychophysik (Elsas,
1886b). Elsas continued the early Marburg debate on the ‘measurability of sensation’ and at the
same time made some timid attempts to integrate it into the new approach taken by Cohen in his
1883 monograph.
4.1. Elsas’ Über die Psychophysik
Elsas organized his book around two questions: 1. “Are Fechner’s measuring formulas mathemat-
ically and physically correct and derived from the data?” (Elsas, 1886b, p. VI). 2. “Is psychophysics
in the sense of Fechner possible in general?” (Elsas, 1886b, p. VI). Elsas answered both these ques-
tions with a resounding ‘no’. In this sense Elsas was more radical than both Stadler and Müller. In
the language introduced by the latter, he intended to criticize both the ‘problem’ and ‘axiom’ of
psychophysics. In what follows, for reasons of brevity I will concentrate on the third and final part
of the book, in which Elsas dealt with question 2., which is of course the one richer in philosophical
implications (see also Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 229ff.).
After a long digression on Bois-Reymond’s (1882) theory of quantity (Elsas, 1886b, p. 50–61; cf.
Darrigol, 2003, p. 540)—Elsas argued against the very possibility of ‘measuring the sensation’ via
its functional relation with the stimulus. Elsas defined the concept of ‘function’ as the ‘production’
of quantity from other quantities. For instance, the area of a triangle is a function of two variables,
base and altitude (Elsas, 1886b, p. 61). However, something different is meant when one says that,
according to Ohm’s law, the current through a conductor between two points is a function of the
voltage across the two points and a constant of proportionality, the resistance (Bois-Reymond, 1882).
According to Elsas, in the latter case we assume, at least implicitly, that there is a causal connection
that serves as the basis of the functional relationship (Elsas, 1886b, p. 61f. cf. Heidelberger, 2010).
The volume of Knallgas or oxyhydrogen that can be produced by water electrolysis in a given amount
of time measures the electric current because the current causes the electrolysis; or, to take a simpler
example, the thermometer measures temperature because equal temperature differences cause equal
expansions of the mercury column, etc.
No such causal connection can be found between stimulus and sensation. Thus, Fechner has no
real reason to claim that equal ‘difference sensations’ are proportional to equal ‘sensation differences’.
The question is not merely epistemological; Elsas showed that, without having a causal connection
as a guide, it is easy to lose grasp of the mathematical derivation. Let’s grant Fechner that his
“constant k has the same meaning as the practical measuring unit for sensation” (Elsas, 1886b,
p. 17); then inconsistencies arise in his system of formulae. According to eq. (ii), k is the value of
the sensation difference ∆γ that corresponds to ∆β : β = 1, that is, to a doubling of the initial
stimulus β; according to eq. (v), k is the value of the sensation difference ∆γ that corresponds to
β = e, where e is the base of the natural logarithm (the natural logarithm of e is 1); according to
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eq. (vii), ∆γ = k when β0 : β = 1 : e (the natural logarithm of 1 is 0).5 Thus, without an underlying
causal connection, a mere functional relation is not sufficient to establish a quantitative comparison.
It is true that, as Fechner points out, even in physics a functional relationship does not always
imply a causal relationship (Fechner, 1882, p. 227); the frequency of a pendulum is a function of
the pendulum’s length, the orbital velocity of a planet of its distance from the sun, etc.; however,
no causal relationship between these pair of quantities is implied (Elsas, 1886b, p. 65). However,
according to Elsas, at a deeper level, there must always be “a causal condition at the basis of the
functional connection” (Elsas, 1886b, p. 65); in the cases just mentioned, it is the gravitational
force (cf. Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 230ff.). Thus there are only two alternatives. If, as Fechner
claims, there is no causal relationship between the body and the mind, then the connection between
stimulus and sensation cannot be expressed through a mathematical equation; the latter is not
measurable. What Fechner constructed is only “pseudo-physics [Scheinphysik]” (Elsas, 1886b, p. 67).
If Weber’s law were really an expression of the causal connection between stimulus and sensation,
then Fechner’s psychophysics would be a “real physics of the soul” (Elsas, 1886b, p. 64). However,
the existence of a causal relationship between stimulus and sensation, the body and soul, seems to
be incompatible with energy conservation.
Thus, Elsas did not seem to allow for any appeal against his draconian statement: “Mathematical
psychology, psychophysics and physiological psychology—three absurd expressions [Bezeichnungen]!”
(Elsas, 1886b, p. 79). The only escape, in Elsas’ view—as Stadler had already suggested (Stadler, 1878,
p. 223; cf. Elsas, 1886b, p. 74; fn. 20)—is to consider the causal relationship not between stimulus and
sensation, but between stimulus and the peripheral/central nervous system: “then psychophysics
becomes nothing but common physiology” (Elsas, 1886b). As Elsas put it in the opening of a
contemporary semi-popular introduction to acoustics, “[t]he object of sensations is always motion,
which is transmitted to the nerves of our sense organs and through them is transported to our brain”
(Elsas, 1886a, p. 1). We can say that hearing is different from sight, but we are not able to express
in words this difference between sound and color. The only difference is in the types of motion that
excite our sense organs; this difference is investigated by physics, “the task of which is to reduce
the natural phenomena to motion” (Elsas, 1886a, p. 1). If one cannot make use of the concepts of
force and motion, Elsas concludes rather narrow-mindedly, then no mathematics can be applied
(Elsas, 1886b, p. 70). Sensation is not an object of scientific knowledge; it is not a part of nature; it
has no reality for the mathematical physicist; it cannot be treated mathematically as a measurable
quantity (Elsas, 1886b, p. 70).
4.2. With or Against Cohen
The role of sensation, Elsas concluded in his book, is epistemological. Sensation expresses the
need to go beyond measurable extended quantities, to look at that ‘something’ which is extended,
and provides physical content to extension. This is, in Cohen’s interpretation, what Kant had tried to
express in the Anticipations of Perception, by connecting sensation, reality and intensive magnitude
(Elsas, 1886b, p. 75f.). E.g., as Elsas put it, ‘velocity’ as a physical concept cannot be reduced to the
differential quotient of space and time: it “is an intensive magnitude; the extensive quotient is only
the mathematical expression of it but not an adequate one” (Elsas, 1886b, p. 68). In this way Elsas
attempted to ‘rephrase’ Cohen’s infamously obscure prose in a language more familiar to science
5Recall that eq. (vii) is derived from γ0 − γ = k log β0 − log β.
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practitioners: “At least I hope that I have not changed something essential in this translation from
the scholastic language of the philosophers into the one of the physicists” (Elsas, 1886b, p. 76).
These remarks seem to be tacked on at the end of the book, rather than part of its main line
of argument.6 However, they show that, in contrast to Stadler, Elsas had at least tried to embrace
Cohen’s new course. This was far from obvious. In contrast, Müller’s attitude towards Cohen’s work
dramatically changed after the latter’s 1883 book. In his 1886 habilitation writing, Das Problem
der Continuität im Mathematik und Mechanik (F. A. Müller, 1886), Müller became highly critical
of Cohen’s connection of the ‘differential’ and the intensive magnitude. Interestingly, according to
Müller, the “difficulties which Cohen got tangled up in the development of his thought” should
be traced to the fact that he was misled by the analogy with psychophysics. Cohen, in Müller’s
view, “committed the same mistake that psycho-physics fell into” (F. A. Müller, 1886, p. 96n.); he
attributed “to something which, like the differential, is not a real object [. . .], a magnitude, indeed
an intensive magnitude” (F. A. Müller, 1886, p. 96n.). Müller’s remark is important insofar as it
confirms that Cohen, more or less consciously, tried to transfer the approach that psychophysics had
applied to the intensive magnitude of psychological quantities to the intensive magnitude of physical
ones. Just as psychophysics wanted to measure sensation as the accumulation of infinitesimally small
sensation increments, Cohen wanted to present the ‘production’ of finite quantities in physics as the
infinite summation of infinitesimal quantities. However, as Müller pointed out, this is “a complete
misunderstanding of the method of limits” (F. A. Müller, 1886, p. 96n.).
Müller’s attacks, who “for some years was part of our restricted circle,” came as a surprise (Elsas
to Lasswitz, Jan. 7, 1887; CN, p. Br. 11, 171). Elsas pointed this out in a letter to Kurd Lasswitz at
the beginning of 1887, when he thanked the latter for the positive review (Lasswitz, 1887a) of his
psychophysics booklet in the Deutsche Literaturzeitung—Germany’s most important general review
journal. Elsas did not want to influence Lasswitz’s judgment, whom Natorp had asked to review
Müller’s book for the Philosophische Monatshefte (Natorp to Lasswitz, Sep. 24, 1886; CN, p. Br. 10,
170). However, he did not hide his disappointment towards Müller’s behavior, after all Cohen had
done for him (Elsas to Lasswitz, Jan. 7, 1887; CN, p. Br. 11, 171f.). Nevertheless, he also had to
admit the difficulties of fully embracing Cohen’s approach: “Often I myself am not sure if Cohen
really means and says what I read off or hear from his elliptic remarks” (Elsas to Lasswitz, Jan. 7,
1887; CN, p. Br. 11, 172). Elsas expressed a similar uneasiness a month later in another letter to
Lasswitz (Elsas to Lasswitz, Feb. 8, 1887; CN, p. Br. 12, 182).
Lasswitz (1848–1910) was a high school teacher from Gotha who was working on the history
and philosophy of atomism (Lasswitz, 1878; Lasswitz, 1884). He became interested in Cohen’s work
on the history of the infinitesimal calculus (Lasswitz, 1885a; Lasswitz, 1885b), possibly after a
correspondence (Eccarius, 1985) with one of Cohen’s most renowned mathematician critics, Georg
Cantor (Cantor, 1884). Lasswitz’s review of Müller’s book became a long paper entitled “Das Problem
der Continuität” (Lasswitz, 1888). Beside addressing some of Müller’s criticisms (Lasswitz, 1888,
p. 24–28; see also Lasswitz, 1887b), Lasswitz mostly gave his take on Cohen’s connection between
the differential and intensive magnitudes. Motion, he explained, as a change of space extension
in a certain time span, has no physical reality. In every instant, there is no change of position,
6I disagree with Heidelberger’s claim that Elsas “associates this [his critique of psychophysics ] with Cohen’s theory
of infinitesimals” (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 230). I suspect that Elsas’s emphasis on “role that causality plays in
measurement” (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 229) was formulated before (possibly already in the answer to the 1881
Preisaufgabe) and independently from Cohen’s 1883 book; only as an afterthought Elsas tried to give some Cohenian
flavor to his line of argument.
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thus no motion. The physical reality of motion has to be searched for in something that is beyond
extension, but possesses a greater or smaller ability to generate a determinate motion (Lasswitz,
1888, p. 19ff.). However, this ‘intensity’ of motion finds mathematical expression in the differential
function dy = f ′(dx), and not in the differential dx, as Cohen misleadingly claimed (Lasswitz,
1888, p. 29–31). Yet Müller remained unconvinced. He replied to Lasswitz in October 1887, calling
Cohen’s work on the infinitesimal method “one of the most monstrous births in the entire history
of philosophy” (Müller to Lasswitz, Oct. 26, 1887; CN, p. Br. 13, 172). Müller died a few months
later of a severe lung disease, so that no further discussion was possible.
4.3. The Fechner-Elsas Debate
Toward the end of 1887, Elsas sent Lasswitz detailed comments on the latter’s “essay on the
problem of continuity” (Elsas to Lasswitz, Nov. 9, 1887; CN, p. Br. 14, 179). He also took the
opportunity to announce that he had finished another paper on psychophysics for the Philosophische
Monatshefte: “Even though I’m very busy with accumulators and galvanometers, I did not want to
hesitate too long in answering Fechner’s paper in the Philos. Studien” (Elsas to Lasswitz, Nov. 9,
1887; CN, p. Br. 14, 182). In fact, the indefatigable Fechner again made the effort to answer some
of his critics, Elsas himself and Alfred Köhler (1886), in Wilhelm Wundt’s journal (Fechner, 1888)
which, in spite of the title, mainly dealt with empirical psychology. Fechner was 86 years old, and
as he recognized half jokingly, this may have been the last time that he was able to defend his own
scientific creature (Fechner, 1888, p. 163).
Fechner’s reply to Elsas is too long and detailed to be dealt with here. However, a point is worth
noticing. Here Fechner repeated, even more clearly than in Müller’s review, that the assumption
that ‘difference sensations’ are proportional to ‘sensation differences’ was merely the “simplest
hypothesis” (Fechner, 1888, p. 171, 174) from which he could choose (cf. also Fechner, 1888, p. 147ff.
for more details). Fechner calls it the Unterschiedshypothese, the ‘difference hypothesis’ (j.n.d.s are
proportional to sensation differences). Such a hypothesis is acceptable inasmuch as it is implied by
the empirically confirmed logarithmic law. Fechner claims that there is at least one other simple
alternative one can think of, which he calls the Verhältnishypothese, the ‘ratio hypothesis’ (j.n.d.s
are proportional to sensation ratios). This hypothesis, which was adopted by Plateau and Brentano
(and supported by Elsas himself), leads however to a power law which, Fechner claimed, is empirically
wrong (but see of course Stevens, 1961).
However, Fechner had to concede Elsas’ point that, if one assumes the ‘difference hypothesis’,
eqs. (ii), (v) and (vii) are indeed incompatible “as the author [Elsas] has correctly shown on p. 17”
(Fechner, 1888, p. 167). However, Fechner had a quite interesting response. He claimed that the
proportionality between sensation differences and difference sensations applies only to the differ-
ential equation (iii), and not to the finite equation (ii), an equation that he actually never wrote:
“where for God’s sake did I ever put forward equation [ii]?” (Fechner, 1888, p. 168). Thus, in the
reply to Elsas, Fechner may have revealed a quite astonishing fact which, Neo-Kantianism aside, is
relevant to Fechner scholarship in general (cf. Scheerer, 1987). Fechner did not regard eq. (iii) as
an approximation derived from the empirically verified eq. (ii), but vice versa: he saw eq (ii) as the
approximation of the exact eq. (iii) (cf. Dzhafarov and Colonius, 1999). After all, this is confirmed by
the fact that, in the Zend-Avesta, he had introduced the differential equation as an exact equation
before he knew about Weber’s findings (Fechner, 1851). Thus Fechner’s rebuttal to Elsas reveals
that, in contrast to what most of Fechner’s critics had assumed, the passage from Weber’s law (ii) to
the differential equation (iii) via the infamous ‘mathematical auxiliary principle’ was not the spine
of Fechner’s derivation of the logarithmic formula.
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In his reply, Elsas (1888a) had to admit that he could not find eq. (ii) in any of Fechner’s writings
(Elsas, 1888a, p. 132, fn. 1). However, he was not particularly impressed. Even if I cannot do full
justice of Elsas’ thirty-page defense here, I suspect that he did not fully realize the importance of
Fechner’s counter-move. Elsas went on to criticize Fechner’s derivation starting from a more general
finite formula, again attacking the ‘mathematical auxiliary principle’, that, he claimed, Fechner
used more as the wand of a magician, rather than the tool of a craftsman (Elsas, 1888a, p. 134).
Elsas showed that one can actually obtain the logarithmic equation (vii) without magically deriving
it from the finite formula via the auxiliary principle. In this setting, the proportionality factor k
becomes something that has to be obtained by differentiation of the logarithmic equation (v) and
not introduced from the outset in Weber’s eq. (ii) (Elsas, 1888a, p. 136). Thus, the proportionality
between j.n. difference sensations and sensation differences is strictly valid only “when the change
of [γ] and [β] are infinitesimally small” (Elsas, 1888a, p. 137). This, however, might have been the
exact point Fechner wanted to make. The constant k is derived from the logarithmic law and not
taken from the empirical Weber law. It is the logarithmic law itself, taken as measurement formula,
that defines the relation between two units of measure (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. 206). Elsas did
not seem to realize that this might have fended off many neo-Kantian objections.
However, for Elsas, the essential philosophical point has not changed. Let’s concede to Fechner
that the number of ‘sensation differences’ becomes approximately proportional to the number of
‘difference sensations’, the smaller the stimuli difference becomes. Still, Fechner uncritically assumed
that one can measure sensation by adding up sensation differences. However, it is far from obvious
that sensation has such an additive structure (Elsas, 1888a, p. 139ff.). Musical intervals are certainly
quantitatively comparable (a 4th is smaller than a 5th), but cannot be meaningfully added (a
5th plus a 4th equals an octave) (Elsas, 1888a, p. 140). Fechner, Elsas points out, wants us to
believe that sensation is “something spiritual, psychical, and nevertheless has magnitude that can
be connected additively with other magnitudes of the same types”; but Elsas simply could not
understand this: “[f]undamental epistemological views prevent me from doing so” (Elsas, 1888a,
p. 143). The epistemological difference between Fechner and Elsas, I think, boils down to the
following: the transformation of a class of intensities into a class of measurable intensities was for
Fechner a matter of definition, whereas for Elsas it was a matter of physics. Thus, for Fechner the
‘difference hypothesis’ was a better definition than the alternative, whereas Elsas spent the rest of
the paper trying to prove that the ‘ratio hypothesis’ was physically superior.
When Elsas’ rebuttal appeared in the 1888 issue of the Philosophische Monatshefte, Fechner
had already passed away. “The previous remarks,” Elsas acknowledged in a short postscript to his
paper, “are no laurel wreath and no palm branches worth being placed on Fechner’s fresh grave”
(Elsas, 1888a, p. 155). They were written as Fechner was still alive and still speak as if he were
alive, “since Fechner’s contribution to science will never die” (Elsas, 1888a, p. 155). Elsas’ note
was not simply rhetorical. In the same year, Elsas dedicated a long homage to the great scientist
in the national-liberal magazine Die Grenzboten (Elsas, 1888b). Granting Fechner the ‘honors of
war’, Elsas now celebrated Fechner’s work as the first serious critical reflection on the measurability
of mental contents (cf. Elsas, 1888a, p. 114). However, Elsas’ conciliatory remarks could not and
probably were not meant to bridge the wide philosophical divide that separated him from Fechner.
For Fechner, ‘measuring sensations’ was a worthy enterprise, because, as Heidelberger has pointed
out, he ultimately conceived of physical measurement itself as nothing but the refinement of the
resolution power of sensations via measuring apparatuses (Heidelberger, [1993] 2004, p. sec. 6.5 and
in particular p. 246f.); but this point of view was fundamentally foreign to Elsas, who, like most
19th century physicists, regarded sensations as nothing but anthropomorphic slags which physical
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measurement was meant to get rid of.
5. Conclusion: From the Cohen Circle to the Marburg School
In those years, the Marburg critique of scientific psychology was taking a more philosophically
sophisticated form in Natorp’s hands (Natorp, 1887; Natorp, 1888; Natorp, 1893; cf. Luft, 2009);
Elsas’ technical objections against psychophysics were largely forgotten. They are mentioned, albeit
rarely, in the historical literature on psychophysics and measurement theory (Heidelberger, [1993]
2004; Darrigol, 2003), though, surprisingly, never in the literature on Marburg Neo-Kantianism.
Yet Elsas’ work on the topic was respected in the scientific community. Beside Fechner’s own de-
tailed reply, Elsas’ booklet deserved the mention (alongside Paul du Bois-Reymond’s Allgemeine
Functionentheorie (Bois-Reymond, 1882)) of his teacher Helmholtz in his 1887 paper, Zählen und
Messen (Helmholtz, 1887). The reference to Elsas reveals that Helmholtz’s paper—which is now
regarded as a classic contribution to the philosophical/mathematical reflection on the notion of
‘measurement’ in science (Darrigol, 2003)—was probably occasioned by the question of the mea-
surability of sensation (Heidelberger, 1993). Thus, the publications of the early ‘Cohen circle’ were
perceived as contributions to this debate. By contrast, Cohen’s commentaries on Helmholtz’s 1887
paper (Cohen, 1888)—which appeared in the same 1888 volume of the Philosophische Monatshefte
as Elsas’ rebuttal to Fechner—give the impression that he did not fully recognize the philosophical
importance of the issue at stake. Elsas’ ‘causal’ theory of measurement is not even mentioned; most
of all, Cohen, intent on attacking Helmholtz’s naive empiricism, does not seem to appreciate the
implications of the latter’s analysis of the conditions governing extensive magnitudes; similarly he
quickly passed over Helmholtz’s definition of intensive magnitude as coefficients (measurable only
as ratios between extensive magnitudes) (Helmholtz, 1887, p. 47). Instead, Cohen concluded the
paper by ‘plugging’ his own work on the intensive magnitude as infinitesimals (Cohen, 1888, p. 273),
which seems rather out of context.
In the following years, Elsas, a close friend of Heinrich Hertz (Fölsing, 1997, p. 423f.), published
extensively on the new Maxwell-Hertz theory; he introduced an autonomous circuit breaker, alterna-
tive to the ‘Wagner hammer’ (Elsas, 1889b), suggested methods to measure electric resistance (Elsas,
1891c) and the dielectric constants (Elsas, 1891b), etc. However—despite Hertz’s advice not to go
astray “in swampy borderlands” like psychophysics (Hertz to Elsas, Feb. 10, 1889; cit. in Fölsing,
1997, p. 423)—he did not forgo some interesting philosophical escapades (Elsas, 1889a). After Hertz
failed to find a position for him in Bonn (Fölsing, 1997, p. 429f.), he became an extraordinary
professor without salary in Marburg. In a difficult financial situation (Lasswitz to Natorp, June 4,
1895; cit. in Holzhey, 1986a, p. 24, fn. 89), he died prematurely in 1895 of pulmonary tuberculosis.
Cohen’s funeral oration (Cohen, 1895) in his honor is also a recollection of the interdisciplinary
atmosphere of the early Marburg circle. If it was Cohen’s early interest in psychophysics that
contributed to gathering this small group around his Marburg chair, it was Cohen’s ‘infinitesimal
turn’ which had fragmented and eventually dissolved this group. It was not just the ‘traitor’ Müller
that did not follow Cohen’s approach, but also the sincere friend Stadler—since 1892 a professor at
the ETH Zurich (Beller, 2000)—; Elsas attempted to ‘translate’ it for non-philosophically-trained
readers, but ultimately he was himself not fully convinced. It was the newcomer Lasswitz, though
never an ‘official’ member of the Marburg group, who was the first to try to implement a watered-
down version of Cohen’s connection between the ‘intensive’ and ‘infinitesimal’ in his own successful
work as a historian of science (Lasswitz, 1890; see Elsas, 1891aNatorp, 1891), even if his efforts were
not to Cohen’s complete satisfaction (Cohen, 1896, p. XLVII).
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Precisely this combination of transcendental philosophy and history of science became the trade-
mark of the Marburg community at the turn of century. At the end of 1890s—after Natorp became
full professor—Cohen started to talk cautiously of a ‘little school’ that was forming in Marburg
(Cohen to Natorp, Apr. 19, 1897; CN, p. Br. 42, 243 and Cohen to Althoff, May 8, 1897; CN,
p. Br. 43, 244). The titles of the Preisaufgaben launched in those years testify to the historical inter-
ests that dominated this group: Aristotle and mathematics in 1894/95 (Albert Görland), Leibniz’s
foundation of mathematics and natural science in 1896/97 (Ernst Cassirer), Galileo’s Mechanics in
1900/1901 (Enrico DePortu), Faraday’s concept of matter in 1901/1903 (Otto Buek) (cf. Holzhey,
1986a, p. 1:382f.). The prize essays were transformed into often excellent dissertations and mono-
graphs (Görland, 1899; Cassirer, 1902; Portu, 1904; Buek, 1904) which represent some early examples
of the Marburg-style integration of history of philosophy and history of science which soon found
its most successful expression in Cassirer’s Erkenntnisproblem (Cassirer, 1906a).
The interests in psychophysics—the attempt “to make sensation arise and increase till it comes
to consciousness and becomes integral” (Cohen, 1902, p. 441)—faded in the background. However,
interestingly, it did not completely disappear. The Preisaufgabe suggested by Natorp in 1904/1906
concerned the problem of sensation in modern psychology. The prize remained unassigned. However,
in 1906 Johannes Paulsen finished a dissertation on Fechner’s concept of sensation under the guidance
of Cohen and Natorp (Paulsen, 1906–1907). A longer version of it was published as a booklet (Paulsen,
1907) in the first volume of the Philosophische Arbeiten, the series edited by Cohen and Natorp that
was meant to represent (Cassirer, 1906b, p. I-III) what people began to call the ‘Marburg school’ (cf.
Cohen, 1913–1914). Even if Paulsen’s work does not add anything new to the previous neo-Kantian
criticisms of psychophysics (see also Natorp, 1912a), it shows that the issue was still considered
part of the legacy of the Marburg community. After all, as Cohen himself recognized in his Nachruf
for Stadler, it was the latter’s critique of Fechner’s logarithmic formula that led him to take a new
course in his 1883 book (Cohen, 1910a). It is probably not just by chance that a contribution of
Paulsen’s (1912) was included in the 1912 Festshrift for Cohen’s seventieth birthday, testifying to
the role that psychophysics played in the evolution of the latter’s thought.
As we mentioned at the opening of the present paper, this was precisely what Cassirer suggested
in his article (Cassirer, 1912) for the 1912 special issue of the Kant-Studien that was prepared
for the celebration of Cohen’s retirement. Cohen’s interest in the problem of ‘sensation’ in Kant’s
Anticipations of Perception, Cassirer explained, led to the notion of ‘stimulus’ as objectified sensation;
the latter in turn must be ultimately thought of as a ‘motion’. It was the question of the possibility of
‘motion’ as an object of scientific knowledge that ultimately led to Cohen’s interest in the history of
the ‘infinitesimal method’ (Cassirer, 1912, p. 260). Cohen’s Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode,
despite being unsuccessful as a scholarly work on the infinitesimal calculus, exemplified that peculiar
amalgam of history and philosophy of science that became one of the trademarks of the ‘Marburg
school’ (cf. Giovanelli, 2016). However, as we have tried to show, the appearance of that book also
interrupted a fruitful discussion on ‘measurability’ in science which the ‘Cohen circle’ had initiated.
This discussion seems to have left no trace in the major Marburg contributions to philosophy of
science (Cassirer, 1910; Natorp, 1910). It was only in the 1930s, that Cassirer returned, although
briefly, to the issue of measurement in physics in his “Determinismus und Indeterminismus” (Cassirer,
1936). However, he could resume the discussion from the exact point where the 19th century had
left it: physical measurement, Cassirer insisted, is not simply the emancipation of sensation from the
limits imposed by “the fundamental psychophysical law”, “the Fechner-Weber law” (Cassirer, 1936,
p. 42; tr. 1956, p. 32) by means of measuring apparatuses. The ‘physical world’, Cassirer claimed,
is not a mere quantitative refinement of the ‘sensible world’; it is a qualitatively different ‘world’,
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a ‘world of shadows’, a symbolic construction which takes the place of the fullness and color of the
sensible world (Cassirer, 1936, p. 41; tr. 1956, p. 43).
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